Science, a Dooyeweerdian Perspective

This page starts to convey some of Dooyeweerd's philosophy of science. He made many observations on and proposals about science -

• its nature, role, and mission,
• the process of doing science is 'everyday' human activity,
• the variety of sciences,
• the relationship between them, and
• comments on studies of humanity.

• The page on Three Types of Thinking explains the basics of the Dooyeweerdian approach to science, science as isolation of an aspect, and that each science is centred on a different aspect and thus has its own distinct methods.
• That science cannot lead to absolute truth.
• There is also a discussion in the page for analytical aspect, because in the doing of science and theory making, the analytical aspect is paramount.
• There is some material on the explanation page.
• For another useful overview, see also Robert Knudsen's (1979) paper on 'Dooyeweerd's Doctrine on Science' to the American Scientific Affiliation.

Eventually, those portions will be brought here, but at this time I am merely starting this page as a discussion of how Dooyeweerd's views of science relate to others.

The Mission of Science

On the mission of science, Thomas Kuhn, pointed out that:

• A key part of the mission of scientific theories (and a paradigm) is to provide good ground for puzzle-solving, such that accuracy of prediction is high, as are other criteria such as number of different problems solved, elegance, etc.
• But this misses out one important hope, among scientists and laymen alike, that science will give us a good "representation of what nature is really like." That is, it will answer the ontological question of what is really there.

Kuhn believes that the latter cannot be achieved: "There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle." (p.206). Therefore he would presumably limit the mission of science to that of puzzle-solving.

Dooyeweerd, however, believes that the mission of science does include a search for what is 'really there' - but in a way that is different from that which most of us would expect. Since Dooyeweerd himself said "there is no such thing as truth in itself," his search is not that of positivist science, which he roundly criticises. For elaboration of this, see the pages on Truth and Ground Motives. An excellent exposition of this can be found in Clouser's book, The Myth of Religious Neutrality.

• First, the 'really there' that science has a mission to uncover is not entities (things), types of entity and their behaviour, but laws of aspects. Sciences, especially the human sciences like psychology and sociology, tend to focus on entities and to assume that it is the nature of the entity (e.g. the human brain, the social group) that determines behaviour, and hence to understand requires that we understand the entity. Dooyeweerd says that while entities are to be understood, we can only do so if we first understand laws. It is the laws, which are different for each aspect, which are more fundamentally 'really there'. So science should seek to understand laws, rather than entities or behaviours. Kuhn, I think, recognised this to some extent, but does not make the distinction clear.

• One thing that Dooyeweerd does make clear is that science is not one, since ways of knowing are not one. Each aspect has laws that are irreducible to others, each aspect has a different way of knowing (epistemology), each aspect is the centre for a special science, and the scientists in each aspect develop different methods and techniques. Kuhn gave hints of appreciating this when he talked about 'so few ways of seeing' (p.196), though he was referring more to the methods and techniques.

• Third, probably because of this entity focus, science tends to assume that if we understand the part then we can understand the whole. Kuhn, when struggling with the two following points in the Postscript of his latest edition, tries to do so in terms of 'neural apparatus' (p.195). Dooyeweerd, on the other hand, puts it the other way round: we can only fully understand the (functioning of) the part once we understand the (functioning of) the whole. In particular, it is not the functioning of the neural apparatus that determines our perceiving, but rather our perceptual functioning that determines the activity of our neural apparatus. So, while Kuhn and others puzzle over the "experience and knowledge of nature embedded in the stimulus-to-sensation route" (p.196) Dooyeweerd would explain it quite clearly in terms of the human person functioning in several aspects, first the sensitive then the analytical and possibly followed by the formative and lingual and even later aspects. Our 'embedded' knowledge of, for example, ethics, is closely linked to our actual functioning in the ethical aspect, and not just to the (sensitive) act of sensation. Every aspect is involved in our fullest form of knowing, not just one. However, we can gain a clearer picture of this in the following two points.

• Fourth, this process of theory-making, which Clouser calls higher abstraction (which involves isolation of an aspect in order to study its laws) can never, of itself, discover the whole 'really there', not even in that aspect. This is due to the fact that this process is part of human functioning, functioning in the analytical aspect. However, for two millennia thinkers have tended to presuppose that theory-making is the ideal way to truth. Kuhn, it seems to me, was still clinging to this presupposition, expecting too much of theoretical thinking. But he had come, perhaps unwillingly, to the conclusion that theory-making cannot find the the full truth about what is 'really there', in the quotation above. Dooyeweerd would agree, but would say that there is another way to grasp what is 'really there'.

• Fifth, though such analytical functioning cannot fully grasp what is 'really there', this does not mean it can never be grasped. Dooyeweerd claims that the kernel of each aspect can be grasped by our intuition, and our everyday functioning. Dooyeweerd saw intuition (pre-theoretic thinking) as a completely different kind of thinking from theoretical: theoretical thinking involves isolation of a single aspect while everyday (pre-theoretic) thinking involves our diverse functioning and diverse ways of knowing in all aspects. However, most scientists - and indeed most of us - have tended to assume that intuition is merely a stunted, fuzzy and partial form of theoretical thinking, and has therefore little value in itself. Some, of course, know that intuitive thinking does have value in its own right, but see it in rather mystical terms. Dooyeweerd, I think, explains it, and does so in a way that enriches rather than impoverishes.

• We can never fully know. That is, science, however perfect, can never lead us to any absolute truth. This is because
  • The analytical aspect that is the core aspect of the doing of science is non-absolute.
  • The root of all science and theory is religious rather than theoretical: religious presuppositions and ground motives that drive theoretical thinking forward. As Dooyeweerd has said, "The absolute has a right to exist only in the religious."
  • Reality 'resists' being pulled apart by the isolative tendency of sicence. The aspect on which a particular science centres is non-absolute but always refers beyond itself to all the others, so that full isolation is, ultimately, not possible.

  (The last-mentioned is, perhaps, part of the reason why sciences tend to encroach on each other's territory.)

What I have portrayed of Kuhn's ideas is, of course, oversimplified and highly selective. For example, I have not discussed the main thrust of his work, paradigms, and nor have I mentioned what he often refers to, namely the apparatus and techniques by which scientists are enabled to 'see' what is invisible, such as tracks of alpha particles. But, perhaps shortly, I will extend this discussion to encompass the important concept of paradigms.

Sciences

Each aspect delineates the proper boundary of each science. For example, the proper boundary of the biotic sciences is life functions and organism, not sentience. But sentience has a biotic aspect that supports it, such as the special type of living and repair found in nerve cells. Specifically, no science should reduce the notions of another science to it. Social science is in particular danger of doing just that: abrogating to itself the sciences of all post-social aspects, seeing things like economics, juridics, ethics and religion as emerging purely from social interaction and institution. Ethics has something that is important that is beyond the very vision of social science, for example. Religion is not purely a means of social cohesion or division.

However, those who use Dooyeweerd's aspects as a guide to what the sciences are, and what their boundaries and research methods are, should be modest, because, as we have seen, we can never fully know the kernel of the aspect. So we should not arrogantly tell scientists "You should be working in that way, not this". Rather, we should suggest that their scientific endeavours will be more fruitful, especially in the long term, if they consider certain things that are now being overlooked. Remember that scientific endeavour itself helps us understand the kernel of the aspect better, and thus the aims and limits of that science - a circular and iterative rather than linear process.

Here is a table of sciences and some of their research methods.

Aspect	Kernel Meaning	Science(s)	Research Methods
Quantitative	quantity, amount	Arithmetic, Statistics, Algebra	Deduction and theorem proof
Spatial	continuous extension, space	Geometry, Trigonometry	Geometric proof, trigonometric investigations.
Kinematic	movement; flowing movement	Kinematics, Fluid dynamics	?
Physical	energy + mass	Quantum physics, physics, chemistry, materials science, mechanics.	Laboratory experiment, with physical reasoning.
Biotic	life functions	Life sciences, physiology, biology.	Greenhouse experiments, field studies, taxonomic analysis
Sensitive	sense, feeling, emotion	Psychology, Sensory sciences.	Stimulus-Response trials, control groups, etc.
Analytical	distinguishing	Logic, Analysis.	Logical proofs; some overlap with the above, esp. for cognitive science.
Formative	history, culture, technology: shaping and creativity	'Sciences of the Artificial' [Simon]. Also historical studies.	Game playing, puzzle-solving, various others, etc. Model building. Forensic methods.
Lingual	symbolic communication	Linguistics, Semiotics.	Cognitive studies, Model building, theorizing. Hermeneutics.
Social	social interaction and institution	Social science.	Surveys, questionnaires, interviews. etc.,Model building.
Economic	frugal use of resources	Economics, Management science.	Statistics is used a lot, but that is not restricted to economics. Modelling, Theorizing.
Aesthetic	harmony, surprise, fun	Aesthetics.	?, theorizing
Juridical	what is due; 'retribution', rights and responsibilities	Juridics, Legal science.	Theorizing; review of cases and long term histories.
Ethical	self-giving love	Ethics.	?
Pistic	vision, aspiration, commitment, creed, religion	Theology, also some of anthropology.	Reference to sacred writings, hermeneutics, theorizing, anthropological studies.

Dooyeweerd's proposal gives us a means of delineating the 'proper' boundary, or at least the core, of each science. In this way, it fulfils the statement in the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, that, while science might tell us what is true, philosophy tells us what is truth and what is science.

Study of Humanity

To Dooyeweerd, philosophy shares with science its analytical approach, but whereas science is centred on a single aspect, philosophy is multi-aspectual, trying to understand the nature of science as such, knowledge as such, truth as such, good and evil, and the like.

The Process of Scientific Endeavour as Everyday Activity

Therefore, though the core act of science is to isolate, the process by which science is done by human beings is multi-aspectual everyday activity. This is why, for example, a scientist's economic status, social standing or religious commitment can affect her/his science - as can his/her ability to communicate scientific ideas via papers, conferences, etc. and to network with others. But it also means that though these things do affect a person's doing of science, that person can still do good quality science irrespective of these factors - that is, even a poor communicator with poor social skills can still do excellent science, even if their peers do not think so; and this is a particular problem when this poor communicator is working in a new paradigm which peers do not see the value of. [One in the eye for peer review processes!]

Relationship Between Sciences

An example may be found in the debate between Chomsky and Dummett about the nature and study of language. Chomsky held language to be 'internal' to the speaker, that is, a (supervened) property of the language system in the human mind/brain. So 'a language' can be nothing more than the property of an individual's language system. As the language system develops, so the language of that individual develops. Against this, 'externalists' like Dummett [1986, cited by Bezuidenhout, 2006] argue that this does not do justice to issues like the suppression of minority languages by dictators, where the language is independent of any particular speaker, nor can it easily recognise the possibility that we can be mistaken about the meanings of words in our language. Language is a social thing and 'a language' is something that cannot be considered purely internally. But Chomsky replied [2000:49]:

"The concept of language that Dummett takes to be essential involves complex and obscure sociopolitical, historical, cultural and normative-teleological elements. Such elements may be of some interest for the sociology of identification within various social and political communities and the study of authority structure, but they plainly lie far beyond any useful inquiry into the nature of language or the psychology of users of language."

He then gave examples of linguistic features (specifically the binding of pronouns) which cannot be accounted for from a social viewpoint.

Both Chomsky and Dummett seem to make valid points, which seem to contradict each other; how can they be reconciled? Dooyeweerd might help us. First, Chomsky was concerned solely with how language may be studied scientifically, holding that such external factors make scientific study impossible. Affirming this, Dooyeweerd would hold that the 'scientific' study of language focuses on the lingual aspect, abstracting it from the rest of the meaning of reality. Secondly, the issues important to Dummett are of other aspects, and thus cannot be studied by the science of linguistics directly in the way lingual factors can be. But Chomsky disregards them as "obscure" - and Dooyeweerd would censure him for doing this. Those in a particular science should be humbly aware of issues from all other aspects, because of the inherent inter-aspect relationships, especially anticipatory ones. In particular, unless linguists take post-lingual issues seriously, they cannot account for a host of linguistic phenomena.

Thus, Dooyeweerd can help us address the very practical matter of what should be taken account of in any science.

Here are a few extra, earlier notes:

• The attempt of logical positivism to apply the tenets and methods of physical sciences to areas like psychology, sociology, economics, is misplaced. It was trying to apply what is appropriate in a determinative science to normative ones.

• The success of the physical sciences in leading us to apparently absolute truth, in the 17th, 18th etc. centuries, can be traced to the determinative nature of the laws of physics and mathematics. That is why experiments were repeatable and why rational arguments held with great precision across different situations. But we cannot hope for this in the sciences of the normative aspect. Dennett's hope for a "materialistic science not only of the brain but also of the mind" is misplaced if Dooyeweerd is correct (but see comparison between Dooyeweerd and Dennett; Dennett does not in fact achieve a purely 'materialist' science of mind, but postulates something not dissimilar to aspects). Such attempts at 'materialist' or 'objective' sciences are tantamount to reducing one science to another inappropriately.

• Not only should we not reduce normative sciences to determinative sciences, but we should keep the normative sciences themselves distinct. For example, psychologists would like to reduce linguistics and social science to psychology. Frequently, theology has been reduced to a social science - even by theologians themselves.

• However, the methods of a different scientific area can sometimes be applied with benefit to another area - for example mathematics to physics, economics, etc. But this application is metaphorical, and should be seen as such. It should be used only to inspire and stimulate, not to restrict and reduce.

References

Chomsky, N. (2000). New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. UK, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dennett, DC (1989, 1998) The Intentional Stance, Bradford Books, MIT Press, Mass, USA.

Dummett, M. (1986). A nice derangement of epitaphs: some comments on Davidson and Hacking. pp. 459-76 in E. Lepore (ed.) Truth and Interpretattion: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lepore, E. & Smith, B.C. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. OUP.

Created 15 October 1999. Last updated: 24 November 1999 major rewrite. 7 February 2001 copyright, email. 14 February 2001 label 'diffnt.epist'. 27 April 2001 better intro and link to thinking.html. 19 December 2002 added link to Knudsen. 16 February 2003 added 'no truth in itself' and Sciences section. 3 March 2003 Filled out never.fully.known; added table of sciences, and section of relationships between sciences, new intro, section on human studies, .nav. 7 March 2003 made links relative. 16 April 2005 E.A. Singer. 12 February 2008 Chomsky+Dummett.